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1. Introduction
Grossman and Hart (1986) developed the incomplete contracts approach to analyze the costs
and benets of vertical integration, which could explain why rms have boundaries, and why
not all transactions are taking place within a single rm. The basic idea is that contracts
cannot specify all states of nature or all actions in advance, or there are states of nature
or actions which cannot be veried ex post by third parties, and which therefore are not ex
ante contractible. They used this approach to develop theories of ownership and vertical
integration. When contracts cannot specify all possible uses of an asset, the contract ex ante
must leave some discretion over the use of the assets: in other words it must allocate ownership
of the asset to one or the other party. The benet of integration is that the owner avoids hold-
up by the other party, which in turn will enhance her incentives to invest in the relationship.
The cost is that the other party will tend to under-invest in the relationship.
In this paper we show how the incomplete contract approach can be used to think about
the internal organization of rms. The rst half has a theoretical focus; we look at how formal
and real authority are allocated between the rms owner and its employees, between the top
managers and sub-ordinates, and between rms and nanciers. We also examine how the
allocation of authority a¤ects communication within the rm.
In the second half of the paper we analyze some of the empirical literature, examining rst
the determinants of organization (focusing on delegation/decentralization) from the perspec-
tive of the Grossman-Hart approach and its extensions, and second the e¤ects of decentral-
ization on rm performance. The emphasis is on looking at stylized factsfrom large-scale
econometric studies of rms, rather than at case studies. Case studies are helpful in suggesting
theoretical approaches and mechanisms, but are poor for hypotheses testing as they are small
in number and highly selected. As with the theory, we also look at decentralization within
rms, rather than the more commonly studied issue of boundaries of the rm or vertical in-
tegration which was the original motivation for Grossman and Hart (1986). 1 We nd some
support for aspects of the incomplete contracts approach in the importance of the congruence
of preferences and rm heterogeneity for decentralization. However, we acknowledge that there
are many other stylized facts from the empirical decentralization literature that may require
alternative theoretical perspectives.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines theory. We look at delegation
and authority (2.1), nancial contracting (2.2), and delegation and the informational content of
decision making (2.4).2 Section 3 examines the empirical determinants of rm decentralization,
focusing on some predictions of the theory (such as the importance of preference congruence
as proxied by trust). Section 4 analyzes the e¤ect of decentralization on rm performance. In
Section 5 we conclude and suggest areas for future research.
1See Lafontaine and Slade (2008) for a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on this.
2In Aghion et al. (2013) appendices A and C we also discuss work on academia and multi-divisional rms.
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2. Theory
2.1. A model of delegation and authority in organizations
2.1.1. Basic model
Real authority, i.e. the ability to make decisions, requires information. But acquiring informa-
tion in turn requires time and e¤ort. Thus, for example, the CEO of a big holding company
that consists of several horizontally integrated units, can only devote limited attention to
each unit, which in turn implies that more real authority will lie with downstream agents in
each unit. In fact, increasing the span of control is one way in which a top manager can
commit to leave more real authority, and therefore more initiative, to her subordinates in
various branches of activity. More generally, it is the design of the organization, together with
the allocation of formal decision rights, that will determine how real authority is distributed
within the rm.
The issue of real versus formal authority and of the implications of this distinction for
the optimal design of rm organization, is addressed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) using an
incomplete contracts/property rights approach.
Their basic framework involves two parties: P(principal) and A(agent). It is assumed that
formal authority can be allocated contractually (e.g. shareholders allocate authority to the
board of directors). In turn, boards allocate authority to management and management
to di¤erent layers of management, and so on. By contrast, real authority is exerted by the
party which has information; this may be the party with formal authority, but not neccessarily
so. Contractual incompleteness is again key to the whole analysis: contracts signed ex ante
between P and A cannot specify particular project choices, as these are not veriable by third
parties.
After the contract is signed, both P and A can invest in information acquisition: by
investing e¤ort 1
2
E2; P acquires information with probability E: Similarly, by investing e¤ort
1
2
e2; A acquires information with probability e: An important parameter in the analysis of the
costs and benets of delegating formal (or real) authority to A is the degree of congruence
between Ps and As preferences. Let  denote the probability that Ps preferred project is also
As preferred project (call this congruence between the two partiespreferences), and suppose
that a party gets zero utility if the other party chooses her preferred project and preferences
are not congruent. Finally, assume that an uninformed party will never pick a project at
random as this might be too risky.
The timing of moves is as follows. First, the two parties sign a contract that allocates formal
authority to one party, either P or A. Then, both parties invest in information acquisition, i.e.
P and A choose E and e respectively. Then, if she acquires information, the party with no
formal authority proposes a project to the party with formal authority. The party with formal
authority then either picks her preferred project (if she herself has acquired information) or
she picks the project proposed to her by the party without formal authority if she did not
acquire information. It is in this latter case that real authority di¤ers from formal authority,
since the project is actually chosen by the party without formal authority (the party with
formal authority is uninformed and therefore can only rubberstamp the other partys project
proposal).
For P to delegate formal authority to her agent A, involves a cost and a benet. The cost
is that the agent may choose a project which the principal does not prefer. This is the loss
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of control e¤ect. The benet is that delegating formal authority to the agent encourages her
to invest more e¤ort (i.e. higher e) in information acquisition. This is the initiative e¤ect.
Which e¤ect dominates, in turn depends upon the congruence parameter  : there exists a
cut-o¤ value  such that for  < , the rst e¤ect dominates, and it is better for P to retain
formal authority, whereas for  > , the second e¤ect dominates and it is better for P to
delegate formal authority to A.
Since preference congruence turns out to be so critical to decentralization decisions, we
examine this in the empirical section where there does appear to be some compelling evidence
for the importance of empirical proxies for congruence, such as trust. Below we show that this
is a robust prediction of generalizations to the basic theoretical approach.
2.1.2. Extensions
Subsequent to Aghion and Tirole (1997), AT, several papers have analyzed the allocation of
formal authority internally in organizations. We shall describe some of these attempts in the
next subsections. At this stage, let us mention a rst attempt by Hart and Moore (1999),
HM. HM analyze the optimal allocation of authority in multi-layer hierarchies. Their model is
one where by assumption, upstream agents are less likely to get new ideas (getting an idea in
HM is like obtaining information in AT) due to their higher span of control. However, when
they do get an idea, this idea has higher potential because of their greater span. HM then
show that it is optimal to have chains of commands, whereby whenever they have an idea,
upstream agents (the generalists) have priority rights over implementing the idea; only if
they dont have an idea can downstream agents (the specialists) have their say on which
action to implement. The intuition is that although upstream agents are less likely to have a
new idea, having priority control rights makes sure that they are in control of all the assets
downstream, which in turn allows them to fully realize the ideas potential. But if they fail
to have a new idea, then the next downstream agent on each branch of the hierarchy should
have her say if she gets an idea, and so on, moving down in the hierarchy.
So far, we have concentrated on the allocation of formal authority within organizations.
However, going back to AT, it could be that delegating formal authority to A is too costly
to P, for example because with arbitrarily small probability, A might take some very costly
action. In that case P will always want to retain formal authority, but yet she may want
to commit herself not to invest too much in information acquisition, so as to preserve the
As incentives to invest in e even though she keeps formal authority with herself. One way
to achieve such commitment is through the choice of span of control. More specically, by
increasing the span of control, i.e. the number of agents and activities under her supervision,
the principal will commit to limiting how much e¤ort she devotes to acquiring information on
each particular activity. This in turn will encourage initiative by agents on each activity, as
they anticipate that the principal will ignore their proposals less often (as she will not have
acquired the relevant information). The choice of the optimal span of control by the principal
at date zero is in turn subject to the same trade-o¤ between the principals loss of control and
the agentsinitiatives as above. This trade-o¤ also underlies other features of organizational
design, such as the role of intermediaries, the costs and benets of having multiple principals
on some activities, or the optimal combination of tasks within teams.
The idea that the design of organizations can serve as a commitment device to delegate
(real) authority, is further explored by Acemoglu et. al. (2007), who use it to test their theory
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of the determinants of decentralization on French and British rm-level panel data (see Section
3 for more empirical detail). The model, closely related to AT, is one in which the owner of a
rm in a given sector can learn about the outcome of an investment decision through observing
other rms in the same sector, or by relying on the superior information of downstream agents
(or on downstream agentse¤ort to acquire information) within the rm. The more precise
the public information acquired through observing other rms in the same sector, the less a
rm needs to delegate control to its better informed agent. This simple observation delivers
a rich set of predictions on the determinants of decentralization. In particular it suggests
that older rms should delegate less as these rms will have had time to learn from more
predecessors in the same sector. It also suggests that the greater the rm heterogeneity in the
same sector, the more a rm in that sector should delegate control as what it observe from
other rms is less likely to be relevant for its own choices (if rms are very di¤erent it is harder
for them to learn from each other). Finally, it suggests that a rm closer to the technological
frontier should delegate control more, as it is more likely to face problems that have not been
solved before by other rms in the same sector. In the empirical section below we discuss the
empirical tests of these three predictions and show that they all receive support in the data.
Even if decentralization was the e¢ cient choice due to characteristics of the rms en-
vironment, Baker et. al. (1999) emphasize that delegation is often informal because the
corporate head quarters (CHQ) must usually sign-o¤ on decisions. The issue is whether the
CHQ credibly commits to allowing the plant manager to e¤ectively make important decisions
and does not override the plant manager (in order to establish her reputation not to interfere).
Thus, the extent of decentralization is the outcome of a repeated game between the CHQ and
manager. Again, trust may facilitate a cooperative outcome to this repeated game, which
suggests that regions or countries which have higher levels of trust should enjoy greater rm
decentralization.
Another reason why delegating formal authority within rms may be di¢ cult is explained
by Bolton and Dewatripont (2011): nothing prevents a principal (the owner of a rm) who
delegates formal authority to an agent to revert her decision at any time. Bolton and Dewa-
tripont point to the so-called Business Judgment Rules, which prevent courts from enforcing
contracts between several parties within the same rm. On the other hand, there are instances
where transfer of formal authority can be enforced nevertheless. First, if this transfer is ac-
companied by a transfer of information from the principal to the agent, then this information
transfer guarantees irreversibility of the transfer of control (see Aghion et al., (2004) for a
more detailed discussion of this point). Second, in a more dynamic context, principals may
want to establish a reputation for not reverting control allocation decisions over time, precisely
to keep the option of credible control transfers in the future. Third, as stressed by Hart and
Holmstrom (2010), taking control back from an agent causes the agent to become aggrieved
which in turn may induce the agent to "shade", i.e. to take unobservable actions which are
damaging to the rm. Finally, as pointed out by Bolton and Dewatripont (2011), there are
at least two examples of contracting situations where Business Judgment Rules do not apply:
nancial contracting, i.e. contracts between a rm and its investors, which we discuss in the
next sub-section, and universities, where the faculty are protected by contracts and tenure
commitments which grants them academic freedom (see Aghion et al., 2008 and Appendix A
of Aghion et al. 2013).
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2.1.3. Summary and empirical implications
There are many other important theoretical aspects of rm delegation stemming from GH
and AT. The next two sub-sections will focus on nance and information, as space constraints
prevent us from elaborating on other important areas such as academia and multi-divisional
rms (the Appendices of Aghion et al., 2012, summarize these contributions).
As a general point, although decentralization models in the GH-AT tradition generate a
rich set of predictions, it is fair to say that relatively few of these have been subject to rigorous
empirical examination. One main reason for this is that it is hard to develop empirical analogs
of theoretical objects such as decentralization, information and communication in one rm,
let alone in large-scale databases suitable for econometric analysis. In Section 3 we focus on
some areas where empirical progress has been made.
2.2. Financial contracting and the role of contingent control allocations
Since the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958)which suggested that the mix of debt and
equity a rm has does not a¤ect its valueeconomists have wondered why most rms have
some combination of debt and equity nancing. Debt has certain tax advantages (interest is
typically tax deductible for the rm but dividend payments are not), yet corporate debt was
prevalent even before corporate income tax existed. Why would rms have debt, then?
Aghion and Bolton (1992) develop an incomplete contracts model which provides a ratio-
nale for holding debt. They argue that the mix of debt and equity nancing divide up the
states of the world where debt and equity holders have control of the rms assets. When
times are good, and cash ows are su¢ cient to meet interest payments, equity holders have
control. When times are bad, debt holders get control.
Suppose that an entrepreneur needs to nance a project that costs K = 10: She does
not have private wealth and thus needs funding from an outside investor. The investor cares
only for monetary benets, whereas the entrepreneur only draws private benets from taking
various actions. Actions are not veriable by a third party and therefore cannot be contracted
upon ex ante. Hence, all the initial contract can do is allocate control rights between the
two parties. The timing of the relationship between the entrepreneur and the investor can be
described as follows. At the contracting stage, the two parties write a nancial contract which
allocates control rights. The contract must be feasible, i.e. it must satisfy the investors
ex ante participation constraint (she must get at least as much as her outside option in
expectation). Then the state of nature is realized. Suppose there is a good state g and a bad
state b, each of which can occur with probability 1/2, and which state is realized is veriable
by a third party. Then an action must be chosen. Suppose that only two actions can be
chosen: a1 and a2. Action a1 maximizes monetary revenue in all states, whereas action a2
maximizes private benets in all states. For example, let (a; ) denote the monetary prot
from taking action a in state ; and B(a) denote the private benet from taking action a in
any state  and suppose that
(a1; g) = 11; (a1; b) = 13
(a2; g) = 10; (a2; b) = 6
and
B(a1) = 2 < B(a2) = 4
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The rst best involves a1 being chosen in state b and a2 being chosen in state g; since
B(a1) + (a1; b) = 15 > 10 = B(a2) + (a2; b)
whereas
B(a1) + (a1; g) = 13 < 14 = B(a2) + (a2; g):
We then compare between three governance structures, which correspond to three types
of nancial contracts. Entrepreneur control (e.g. as implemented through issuing non-voting
shares), would lead to action a2 being chosen in all states, but this would violate the investors
participation constraint since
1
2
(6) +
1
2
(10) = 8 < 10 = K:
The investor has cash which he might use to convince the entrepreneur to take action a1
in state b: However, if most of the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage lies with the
entrepreneur, the prospect of ex post renegotiation will not help satisfy the investors ex ante
participation constraint. In this case, entrepreneur control is not ex ante feasible. How about
investor control (e.g. as implemented through issuing voting equity)? In this case the investor
will choose action a1 in all states, even though action a2 is the rst best action in state b; i.e.
the action that maximizes the sum of monetary and private benets in that state. Now, can
the entrepreneur renegotiate the action from a1 to a2 in state g? The answer is no, simply
because the entrepreneur has no cash she can use to bribe the investor into changing his choice
of action. Investor control satises the investors participation constraint, since
1
2
(11) +
1
2
(13) = 12 > 10 = K:
However it is not rst-best, as total surplus would be maximized by having action a1 taken in
state b and action a2 taken in state g:
Now, consider a contract that species a contingent allocation of control to the entrepre-
neur in state g and to the investor in state b: This contract will lead to action a1 being taken
in state b and action a2 being taken in state g: Contingent control can in turn be imple-
mented through a debt contract that transfers control from the entrepreneur to the investor
in state b:
The idea that contingent control can help align incentives goes beyond nancial contracting.
For example Bolton and Dewatripont (2011) restate the Aghion-Bolton model as one of a
headquarter who commits to replace a divisional manager only in some states of nature (e.g.,
in state b for the above notation). Under this reinterpretation (B(a2) B(a1)) can be seen as
the private cost for the division manager of closing down his unit and thus having his employees
laid o¤, rather than maintaining the unit in operation. This contingent arrangement reduces
the expected monetary losses of the headquarters and simultaneously internalizes the private
costs of closing down units. In a context where the information about  could be manipulated
by the division managers, for example through account manipulation or through risky decision
making (gambling for resurrection) so as to avoid being replaced, contingent control can help
mitigate the problem by o¤ering a guarantee to divisional managers. Another guarantee is to
give managers a stake in the rms prots even when they are being replaced (see Bolton and
Dewatripont (2011) and Garicano (2000)).
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2.3. Delegation as a way to improve the informational content of decision-making
Dessein (2002) analyzes how the allocation of control can help incorporate the agents in-
formation into decision-making in a situation where the agent has private information. In
contrast to Aghion and Tirole (1997), there is no information acquisition e¤ort by the agent
or the principal, therefore in Desseins model the allocation of authority is not so much a
tool to motivate the agent (as in Aghion and Tirole) or to give a supplier incentives to make
relationship specic investments (as in Grossman and Hart). The main insight of Dessein
(2002) is that in a world with asymmetric information and contractual incompleteness, the
delegation of authority from a principal to an agent is often the best way to elicit the agents
private information.
In Desseins setting the agent is assumed to be better informed, but with preferences over
decisions that are not fully congruent with those of the principal. If the principal has authority
(i.e. if she holds the decision rights), which Dessein refers to as centralization, then the
agent communicates his information strategically in order to tilt the principals decision.
Centralization thus results in information loss. However, while delegating control to the
agent avoids this information loss, it also makes the agents biased decision-making prevail.
Delegation thus results in a loss of control. Dessein (2002) shows that for a broad range
of parameters, the loss of control under delegation matters less than the loss of information
under centralization. In particular, the smaller the agents bias (i.e. the more congruent the
principals and agents objectives are), or the larger the agents informational advantage, or
the more uncertainty there is, the more likely it is that delegation is optimal.
An important assumption in Dessein (2002) is that under principal authority, the prin-
cipal cannot commit to not taking the decision which she believes maximizes her expected
utility. She can, however, commit to delegatecontrol rights to the agent. This is consistent
with the incomplete contracting assumption that actions or decisions are non-contractible,
even when control allocation is contractible. Delegation can then be interpreted as a com-
mitment device from the principal to use the agents information in the way that best ts
the agents objectives. While delegation results in biased decision-making (this is the loss
of control e¤ect) it ensures that decision-making responds more to the agents information.
Compare this with centralized authority, which ensures an unbiased decision from the princi-
pals point of view but encourages the agent to distort his information in order to inuence
the principal.
Information communication is modeled using Crawford and Sobel (1982)s model of strate-
gic communication. Since decisions are non-contractible and information is assumed to be soft,
communication between the agent and principal takes the form of cheap talk. However,
strategic communication can be informative if there is su¢ cient preference alignment between
the agent (the sender) and the principal (the receiver). Desseins contribution can be seen as
one of introducing control-rights considerations in strategic communication games, with the
idea that delegation induces communication by the agent to become less strategic, although
at the cost of non-congruent decision-making.
The result that delegation dominates when the agents bias is small is not fully obvious:
communication between the agent and principal is also better under centralization in that case,
as the agent gains less by distorting information when her preferences are more congruent
with those of the principal. Yet Dessein (2002) shows that under general conditions, as
long as the bias of the agent is su¢ ciently small, delegation is always strictly preferred over
centralization. For some specic cases, such as the leading example in Crawford and Sobel
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(1982), Dessein (2002) obtains the striking result that communication never takes place at the
optimum: as long as preferences are su¢ ciently congruent, the principal is strictly better o¤
avoiding communication (and the resulting information distortions) altogether, by committing
to delegate control to the agent.
Overall, this paper provides an important rejoinder to the central insight of the property
rights literature that the cost of integration (or centralization) are the reduced incentives to
either make relationship-specic investments (Grossman and Hart) or to acquire information
(Aghion and Tirole). In Dessein (2002), the cost of centralization (e.g. through integration),
is the distortion and loss of information.
3. Empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization
Recent empirical interest in decentralization has been stimulated by the growth of a substantial
body of evidence that documents persistence performance di¤erences among rms, even in
narrowly dened industries (see Syverson, 2011; Gibbons and Roberts, 2012 or Aghion et al.,
2013, Appendix C). Could these di¤erences be due to di¤erent organizational structures within
rms? This section is organized as follows. Sub-section 3.1 focuses on the measurement of rm
decentralization, 3.2 on the impact of trust on decentralization, 3.3 on empirical implication
of learning models for decentralization and 3.4 documents more general stylized facts of
decentralization. We formally discuss identication issues in more detail in Appendix D of
Aghion et al., 2013.
3.1. Measuring rm decentralization
A key factor in any organization is who makes decisions. A centralized rm is one were
decisions are all taken at the top of the hierarchy, and a decentralized rm is where decision-
making is more evenly dispersed throughout the corporate hierarchy.3
How can the concept of decentralization be implemented empirically? One way is to look
at the organization charts of rms (organogram) as graphical representations of the formal
authority structure. One of the best studies in this area is Rajan and Wulf (2006) who use
the charts of over 300 large US corporations during 1987-1998 to examine the evolution of
organizations (e.g. the number of people who directly report to the CEO as a measure of the
span of control). Unfortunately, as Max Weber and (more recently as discussed above) Aghion
and Tirole (1997) stressed, formal authority is not the same as real authority; the organogram
may not reect where power really lies.4
Observing whether a rm is decentralized into prot centers is useful, as this is a formal
delegation of power - the head of such a business unit will be judged by the CEO on the basis
of the units protability. Similarly if the rm is composed of cost (or revenue) centers this
indicates less decentralization as only costs (or revenue) are likely to be under control of the
3An extreme case of decentralized organizationis an idealized market economy where atomistic individ-
uals make all the decisions and form spot contracts with each other. The origin of many of the debates on
decentralization have their origins in the 1930s, over the relative merits of a market economy relative to a
centrally planned one.
4We focus on decentralization as distinct from managerial spans of control. These are distinct concepts 
the span and depth (number of levels) of a hierarchy are compatible with di¤erent power relationships between
the levels. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the move towards delayering over the last twenty years
has been associated with decentralization (see Rajan and Wulf, 2006).
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manager. If the rm does not even delegate responsibility to a cost or revenue center this
indicates a very centralized company. Acemoglu et al. (2007) use this distinction to classify
rms in their empirical work on French and British rm panel data.
Whether a company is organized into prot centers is a rather crude indicator of decentral-
ization. A better (but more costly) approach is to directly survey rms. Bloom et al. (2012b)
measure decentralization between the plant manager and the corporate central headquarters
(CHQ). They asked plant managers about their decisions over investment (maximum capital
investment that could be made without explicit sign o¤ from central headquarters), hiring,
marketing and product introduction (the latter three on a scale of 1-5). This was conducted
at the same time as the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) management survey.
Bloom et al. (2012b) constructed an empirical summary of decentralization combining
these four measures into a single index by z-scoring each individual indicator and z-scoring
the average (so that the index has zero mean and unit standard deviation). We followed their
approach but combine their data with additional waves of the World Management Survey
conducted in 2007 and 2009 covering eight more countries.
Figure 1 shows that decentralization varies substantially across countries, with the US, the
UK and Northern European countries being the most decentralized and Southern European
and Asian countries the least. There is an even wider spread of decentralization across rms
within every country, as shown in Figure 2.
Decentralization extends beyond just plant managers and the CHQ of course. For example,
one can also consider the autonomy of workers from the plant manager following Bresnahan et
al. (2002). Proxies for this dimension of decentralization include questions indicating greater
worker control over the pace of work and over the allocation of tasks.
3.2. Trust (congruence of preferences)
The Aghion-Tirole approach o¤ers a natural implementation of incomplete contracts to study
decentralization within rms. One key parameter in fostering decentralization is the congru-
ence of preferences between principal and agent. Other theoretical developments following
Grossman-Hart such as Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999) also support this idea. Finding
empirical proxies for the congruence parameter is challenging, but one possibility is to use
measures of trust. In recent years, economists have started to take cultural factors more seri-
ously in determining economic outcomes (Guiso et al., 2006; Greif, 1994). This stems in part
from the inuence of Putnams (1993) work on the importance of social capital. Empirically,
generalized social trust as a proxy for social capital has been found to be associated with many
positive economic outcomes (e.g. see Knack and Keefer, 1997, on trust and growth or Guiso
et al., 2009, on trust and foreign trade and investment).
Bloom et al. (2012b) examine the importance of trust, nding that higher levels of trust
in the region where a plant is located is associated with a signicantly greater degree of
decentralization. As in many other papers, trust is measured using the standard indicators
from the World Values Survey which asks random samples of individuals about generalized
trust. These external measures are matched to plant locations to obtain a measure of trust
in the region. The authors also exploit the fact that their data contains many subsidiaries of
multinational rms to construct measures of trust in the country of origin (the multinationals
headquarters) and the country of location (where the a¢ liate is located). Both of these seem
to matter for decentralization, but the most powerful factor is the bilateral trust between
10
country pairs, i.e. the degree to which people from the subsidiarys parent country trust
people in the country where the plant is located. Multinationals locating in countries that are
seen to be relatively highly trusted (after country location and origin dummies are removed),
are signicantly more likely to decentralize. In other words, even though the UK is overall
a relatively high trust country, multinationals headquartered in the US (where Britain has a
relatively good trust reputation) tend to decentralize more towards their British a¢ liates than
equivalent multinationals headquartered in France (where Britain has a relatively bad trust
reputation for historical reasons).
These results suggest that trust can a¤ect the internal structures of global rms and
that some aspects of organization are transplanted abroad, as suggested by recent theories of
international trade (e.g. Helpman et al., 2004). It ts well the idea that the congruence of
preferences is a major determinant of delegation.
Enforcement of contracts should further foster decentralization, and we do in fact observe
more delegation where there is stronger rule of law5. However, contracts are never perfectly
enforceable, which leaves a role for trust to help generate more delegation. Recently, Bloom et
al. (2012) have been running eld experiments on rms in India, and discovered that family
size (in particular the number of adult male family members) was the key determinant of rm
size, probably due to the importance of trust. Owners only trusted other male family members
to make major managerial decisions as they worried that outsiders would steal from the rm.
Hence, the supply of (trusted) male family member time was typically the binding factor for
rm growth.
3.3. Learning
In the theory section we discussed an extension to the Aghion-Tirole approach when consid-
ering how rms could learn either from others or from themselves. Acemoglu et al. (2007)
examine three predictions from their model (i) delegation should be greater when the industry
is more heterogeneous (so it is harder to learn from others); (ii) the rm is close to the frontier
(so that there are fewer other rms to learn from) and (iii) the rm is younger (so it has less
experience to learn from its own mistakes). Acemoglu et al. (2007) measure decentralization
using both formal measures of whether rms are organized into prot centers as discussed
above (for French rms) and direct survey measures of the power managers have over hiring
decisions (for British rms). In both samples they nd decentralization is more likely in indus-
tries that are more heterogeneous and for rms that are younger or closer to the technological
frontier.
These results are illustrated in Figures 3-5 where the y-axis has the average degree of
decentralization in di¤erent bins of the relevant variables. In Figure 3 there is a reasonably
clear positive relationship after the second decile between decentralization and heterogeneity
(as measured by the dispersion of rm productivity growth). In Figure 4 decentralization
appears to be higher among rms closer to the technological frontier (as measured by the
distance of the rms productivity from the leading rm in the four digit industry). That
more frontier rms should delegate more may also explain why subsidizing higher education,
in particular graduate education, is more likely to be growth-enhancing if universities are more
decentralized (see for example Aghion et al., 2010). Figure 5 shows older rms to look more
5See Bloom et al., (2009). More generally on the importance of law and reputation on contract enforceability
see MacLeod (2007).
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centralized than younger rms, possibly because they have learned better what to do, so there
is less need of delegation to a local manager who is better informed but may not pursue the
principals interests.
3.4. Other empirical factors inuencing decentralization
The development of the incomplete contracts approach as applied to rm decentralization
appears to have some conrmation in the data. The congruence of preferences (as proxied
by trust) and heterogeneity (making it harder to learn) both seem to foster decentralization.
There are many other ndings in literature on the empirical determinants of decentralization.
These are not so obviously implications of the Grossman-Hart approach, but it is worth
considering them.
3.4.1. Firm size and scope
Some basic factors determine decentralization. All else equal, a larger rm will require more
decentralization than a small rm. A sole entrepreneur does not need to delegate because she
is her own boss, but as more workers are added, doing everything herself is no longer feasible.
Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962) stressed that decentralization was a necessary feature of
larger rms, because CEOs do not have the time to take every decision in large rms (see also
Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991). Similarly as rms expand in their scope both geographically
and in product space, local information will become more costly to transmit so this will also
favor decentralization
Most empirical ndings support this. Bloom et al. (2012b) nd that rm size and plant size
are both associated with a signicant increase in their decentralization index. Furthermore,
plant managers in subsidiaries of foreign multinationals have more autonomy than similar
plants of domestic non-multinationals. They interpret this as an indicator that managing at
a distance is harder, inducing headquarters to give more autonomy to local managers.
3.4.2. Human capital
Many models would predict that human capital should be associated with decentralization.
For example, more skilled workers will have greater ability to take on more responsibility.
When the environment changes due to new technologies and organizational change is required,
skilled workers may be better at learning how to cope with the new organizational structure.
There is generally a robust and positive association of decentralization and skills. For
example, Bloom et al. (2012b) measure skills by the proportion of people who hold a college
degree and nd this to be signicantly correlated with decentralization. Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) examine the relationship between skills and organization in some detail, arguing in
favor of skill biased organizational change: i.e. increases in the supply of human capital
will tend to increase delegation. To tackle the endogeneity problem, they use information on
the di¤erential price of skilled vs. unskilled labor in the local market (as indicated by the
wage di¤erential between college educated workers and other individuals). They argue that
this skill premium is partially driven by exogenous shifts in the supply of unskilled workers.
For their sample of UK and French rms they nd that regions where skill premia are higher
have a lower probability of decentralization.
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3.4.3. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
Garicano (2000) formalizes the idea of the rm as a cognitive hierarchy. There are a number
of problems to be solved and the task is how to solve them in the most e¢ cient manner. The
simplest tasks are performed by those at the lowest level of the hierarchy, and the exceptional
problems are passed upwards to an expert. The cost of passing problems upwards is that
communication is expensive. The benet of passing the problem upwards is that it reduces
the cognitive burden on lower level employees.
This framework was designed to address the impact of ICT on rm organization. Inter-
estingly, information technologies have di¤erent implications for decentralization than com-
munication technologies. Consider again the decentralization decision between the CHQ and
plant manager. When communication costs fall through (for example the introduction of e-
mail or company intranets), it is cheaper for the plant manager to refer more decisions to the
CHQ. So communication technologies should cause centralization. By contrast, technologies
that make it easier for the plant manager to acquire information (e.g. Enterprise Resource
Planning software, ERP like SAP) means that decentralization should increase. An example
in law rms would be Lexis Nexis that enables junior lawyers to quickly nd relevant cases
without consulting a more senior associate or partner.
Bloom et al. (2009) test this theory and nd considerable empirical support. Computer
networks (reducing communication costs) signicantly decrease decentralization to plant man-
agers whereas tools to help managers access more information (like ERP) signicantly increase
decentralization.6
3.4.4. Product market competition
Some authors such as Acemoglu et al. (2007) argue that a cause of the aggregate increase in
more decentralized organizations is rapid technological change. An alternative explanation is
that globalization and deregulation have increased the degree of product market competition
which has in turn stimulated organizational change. The theory is ambiguous here. If com-
petition has made swift decisions more important, then this will have increased the salience
of local knowledge, leading to greater decentralization under the framework discussed above
(e.g. Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Similarly if competition aligns the incentives of agents more
with the principal then the costs of decentralization may also have fallen. There are counter-
vailing forces, however. For example, a larger number of rms in an industry aids yardstick
competition, but it may also help learning in the Acemoglu et al. (2007) framework, which
will reduce the need to decentralize.
The empirical evidence, however, seems more clear cut. Bloom et al. (2010) nd a robust
positive association between competition and decentralization using industry import competi-
tion, the inverse of the industry Lerner index, or simply the number of perceived competitors.
A similar positive correlation was reported in Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Marin and Verdier
(2008, 2009). All of these are cross sectional studies, so the positive coe¢ cient on competition
could simply reect unobserved variables correlated with competition. Guadalupe and Wulf
(2009) try to tackle this endogeneity problem using the Rajan and Wulf (2006) panel dataset
6The magnitude of the e¤ect is substantial. An increase in ERP usage by 60% (the average di¤erence
in ICT between Europe and the US) increases a plant managers autonomy by an amount equivalent to the
increase in US college graduates between 1990 and 2000.
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on the changing organizational structure of rms over time. They argue that the Canada-
US Free Trade Agreement in 1989 constitutes an exogenous increase in competition for US
rms in industries where tari¤s were removed. Exploiting this policy experiment reveals that
competition is associated with their proxy for decentralization.
4. Organizational practices and rm productivity
How can researchers identify the e¤ects of organizational structure (e.g. decentralization) on
rm performance?7
4.1. Correlations of performance and organizational practices: the basic identi-
cation problem
Consider the basic production function as:
qit = llit + kkit + ait (4.1)
Where q is ln(output), l is ln(labor) and k is ln(capital) of rm i at time t. Assume that
we can write the TFP term ait as
ait = 0 + mit + uit (4.2)
where mit is an organizational feature of the rm (such as decentralization) and uit is an
unobserved error. Together these equations imply:
qit = 0 + llit + kkit + mit + uit (4.3)
This of course contains several assumptions. It assumes that the relevant organizational
factor enters linearly, whereas organization could instead be a¤ecting the coe¢ cients on the
other factor inputs, and many theories (e.g. of complementarity) would generate the same
predictions. We discuss these below. We will assume that we can deal with the econometric
problems in estimating the coe¢ cients on the production function so that we have a consistent
measure of total factor productivity (see Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes, 2007, for a
discussion of recent contributions). Note that OLS estimates of (4.1) will generally be biased,
as E(mituit 6= 0).
The traditional strategy is to assume that mit is a rm xed e¤ect. So one approach
is simply to recover average rm TFP under this assumption and project it on some cross-
sectional measure of management mi. This will indicate whether there is an association
between the two measures, but not whether the relationship is causal. For example, Bloom
and Van Reenen (2007) show that there is a robust relationship between TFP and their
measure of management quality, but they interpret this as an external validitytest of the
quality of the management data rather than as any causal relationship.
An analogous strategy if there are time varying measures of organization is to treat all
the correlated unobservables as xed, i.e. uit = i + "it with E(miti) 6= 0 but E(mit"it) =
E(mit"it 1) = 0. Then the xed e¤ect model estimated in (say) rst di¤erences would be
ait = mit + "it (4.4)
7Aghion et al (2013, Appendix D) discuss general identication issues in this literature in more detail.
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which can be consistently estimated by OLS.
There are a huge number of studies that have correlated various aspects of the rms
performance on various aspects of its organizational form (e.g. the survey in Lazear and Oyer,
2012). The better studies use micro data and pay careful attention to measurement issues and
need to control for many covariates. For example, Cappelli and Neumark (1999) and Black
and Lynch (2001) examine various aspects of high performanceworkplaces, mostly relating
to employee involvement, team work and meetings. Both papers look across many industries
and nd no direct e¤ect of these measures on performance (in contrast to many case studies).
As we discuss below, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prenushi (1997), however, examined management
practices and performance in 37 US steel mills over time and found a link between upgrading to
bundles of modern practices and improved performance, so the correlation evidence is mixed.
There remain several serious problems. First is the data constraint that measuring organi-
zation is hard and nding data with time series variation even harder. Second, the management
proxies are measured with error, so this will cause attenuation towards zero if the measure-
ment error is classical. This bias is exacerbated in rst di¤erences. Third, and most seriously,
the factors that cause variation in the propensity to adopt organizational practices will also
likely be correlated with those a¤ecting TFP so the assumption is unlikely to hold in most
cases. The bias could be upwards or downwards (e.g. if rms doing badly are more likely to
innovate organizationally as argued by Nickell et al., 2001).
There is no simple solution to these endogeneity problems as we fundamentally need some
exogenous identifying variation. Bloom et al. (2012) implemented a gold standard random-
ized control trial in Indian textile plants. The intervention was by high quality management
consultants to improve a range of management practices (as in Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007)
which appeared to dramatically improve productivity. Most of the quasi-experiments have
been in labor economics. A good example is Lazear (2000) who looked at the introduction of
a pay for performance system for windshield installers in the Safelite Glass Company. Lazear
found that productivity increased by around 44%, with about half of this due to selection
e¤ects and half from the same individuals changing behavior. More recently, Bandiera et al.
(2007, 2009) engineered a change in the incentive pay system for managers in farm. They
have no contemporaneous control group, but can examine the behavior of individuals before
and after the introduction of the incentive scheme. Productivity rose by 21% mainly with at
least half due to improved selection (the managers allocated more elds to the ablest workers
rather than to their colleagues).
4.2. Complementarities between organizational practices
One of the key reasons why rms may nd it di¢ cult to adjust their organizational form is that
there are important complementarities between sets of organizational practices. Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) build a theoretical structure where such complementarities (or more precisely,
super-additivities) mean that rms optimally choose clusters of practices that t together.
When the environment change so that an entrant rm would use this group of optimal prac-
tices, incumbent rms will nd it harder they will either switch a large number of practices
together, or none at all.
This has important implications for productivity analysis. The e¤ects of introducing a
single practice will be heterogeneous between rms and depend on what practices they already
use. This implies that linear regressions of the form of equation (4.3) may be misleading. To
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see this, consider two practices, m1 and m2, whose relationship with productivity is such that
TFP increases only when both are used together.
ait = a0 + 1m
1
it + 2m
2
it + 12(m
1
it m2it) + uit (4.5)
One version of the complementary hypothesis is 1 > 0; 2 < 0; and 12 > 0, i.e. the
disruption caused by just using one practice (m2it) could actually reduce productivity. A
regression which omits the interaction term may m1it m2it nd only a zero coe¢ cient on the
linear terms.
The case study literature emphasizes the importance of complementarities. Testing for
their existence poses some challenges, however, as pointed out most clearly by Athey and
Stern (1998). A common approach is a regression of practice 1 (m1it) on practice 2 (m
2
it) with
a positive covariance (conditional on other factors) indicating complementarity. It is true that
complements will tend to covary positively, but this is a very weak test. There could be many
other unobservables causing the two practices to move together. We need an instrumental
variable for one of the practices (e.g. Van Biesebroeck, 2007), but this is hard to obtain as it
is unclear what such an instrument would be, i.e. could it be legitimately excluded from the
second stage equation? In classical factor demand analysis we would examine the cross price
e¤ects to gauge the existence of complements versus substitutes, i.e. does demand for practice
1 fall when the price of practice 2 rises (all else equal). There still remains the concern that
the price shocks could be correlated with the productivity shocks, but such an assumption is
weaker than assuming unobserved shocks to the rms choice of practices are uncorrelated.
Unfortunately, such tests are particularly hard to implement because there are generally no
market prices for the organizational factors typically considered.
An alternative strategy is to work straight from the production function (or performance
equation more generally). Consider the productivity equation after substituting in multiple
practices:
qit = 0 + llit + kkit + 1m
1
it + 2m
2
it + 3(m
1
it m2it) + uit (4.6)
Ichniowski et al. (1997) estimate a version of equation (4.6) using very disaggregate panel
data on nishing lines in US steel mills, using eleven human resource practices (including
incentive pay, recruitment, teamwork, job exibility and rotation). Their measure of produc-
tivity is based on downtime - the less productive lines were idle for longer. They nd that
introducing one or two practices has no e¤ect on productivity, but introducing a large number
together signicantly raises productivity. Although the endogeneity problem is not eliminated,
the controls for xed e¤ects, looking within one rm and using performance data, helps reduce
some of the more obvious sources of bias.
4.3. The role of ICT again
One of the key productivity puzzles of recent years has been why the returns to the use
of information and communication technologies appear to be so high and so heterogeneous
between rms and between countries. For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) nd that the
elasticity of output with respect to ICT capital is far higher than its share in gross output (see
also Stiroh, 2004). One explanation for this is that e¤ective use of ICT also requires signicant
changes in rm organization. Changing the notation of (4.6) slightly, we could write
qit = 0 + llit + kkit + ccit + mm
2
it + cm(cit mit) + uit (4.7)
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with the hypothesis that cm > 0. This is broadly the position of papers in the macro literature
explaining the faster productivity growth of the US than Europe after 1995 (e.g. Jorgenson
et al., 2008).
Bresnahan et al. (2002) try to test this directly by surveying large US rms on decen-
tralization and team work (for a cross section) and combining this with data on ICT (from a
private company Harte-Hanks), and productivity from Compustat. They nd evidence that
cm > 0, i.e. that computer capital is more productive when rms have greater decentral-
ization and team work. Bloom et al. (2012a) broaden the sample to cover both the US and
rms in seven European countries, and nd evidence of complementarity of ICT with people
management. They also show that their results are robust to controlling for rm xed e¤ects.
Careful econometric case studies (e.g. Baker and Hubbard, 2004; Bartel et al., 2007) also iden-
tify di¤erential productivity e¤ects of ICT depending on organization form. Lemieux et al.
(2009) show that one particular people management practice, performance pay, is becoming
increasingly important in the US and has a signicant impact on widening inequality. They
suggest that the spread of ICT innovations has facilitated the adoption of performance pay
techniques.
4.4. The role of human capital
One of the reasons for the renewed interest in organizational change by labor economists
was the attempt to understand why technology seemed to increase the demand for human
capital, thus contributing to the rise in wage inequality experienced by the US, UK and other
countries since the late 1970s. Many theories have been proposed (see Autor et al., 2003, for a
review), but one hypothesis is that lower IT prices increased decentralization for the reasons
outlined in Garicano (2000), and decentralization leads to an increase in inequality (Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Further, decentralization is complementary with skills for at least
three reasons. First, skilled workers are more able to analyze and synthesize new pieces of
knowledge, so the benets of local processing of information are enhanced. Additionally, skilled
workers are better at communicating, which reduces the risk of duplication of information.
Second, the cost of training them for multi-tasking is lower, and they are more autonomous
and less likely to make mistakes. Finally, workers who are better educated may be more
likely to enjoy job enrichment, partly because they expect more from their job in terms of
satisfaction.
This has three main implications:
1. Decentralization leads to skill upgrading within rms. This is due to the fact that the
return to new work practices is greater when the skill level of the workforce is higher.
2. A lower price of skilled labor will accelerate the introduction of organizational changes.
3. Skill intensive rms will experience greater productivity growth when decentralizing.
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) nd support for all three predictions. They estimate produc-
tion functions (with the relevant interactions), skill share equations and organizational design
equations. A novel feature of this approach is that because labor is traded in a market, it is
possible to use local skill price variation to examine complementarity issues. They nd that
higher skill prices make decentralization less likely, consistent with skill-biased organizational
change.
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5. Conclusions
We began by surveying the theoretical literature on the organization of rms and the optimal
decentralization of decision rights within rms. We discussed how the concept of incomplete
contracts shapes this organization of decision making within rms. In particular, the inability
to contract over all possible states of the world leads principals to delegate control to agents
as a way to ex ante commit to letting agents expropriate some of the returns from costly
activities, like collecting information on the best actions to take.
We then overviewed some of the empirical evidence on the organization and management
of rms, focusing on decentralization. We looked at within rm organization, especially de-
centralization following the theoretical survey, and we also focus on econometric studies of
large scale rm databases rather than case studies. There has recently been a number of
papers measuring management and organizational practices across rms and countries. Like
productivity, decentralization varies a lot across rms and countries (e.g. Scandinavian and
Anglo-Saxon rms are more decentralized than those from Asia and Southern Europe). A
number of factors highlighted in the incomplete contract theory are shown to be important for
accounting for di¤erences in rm organization - in particular heterogeneity and the congruence
of preferences (as proxied by trust). Several other factors appear robustly positively correlated
with decentralization, such as product market competition, human capital and rm size.
In terms of future work, we see two areas of opportunity. First, there is a need to match
up empirical work more closely with the theory. Until recently, comprehensive datasets on
measures of organization across many rms and countries were unavailable. Now that this
gap in the core data infrastructure is being covered, there is a great opportunity for testing
some of the theories of organizational economics. This is challenging, rst because many of
the important aspects in the environment emphasized in the theoretical literature are hard
to match into empirical counterparts, and second because identifying the causal relationship
between organizational changes and rm outcomes like productivity and growth is di¢ cult.
Even with strong measurement and tight links to theory, it is essential to identify the direction
of causality in some of stylized empirical results we have identied above - for example, do
more skilled managers enable decentralized decision making, or are skilled managers attracted
to decentralized rms? We see the theory and empirics of the organization of the rm as one
of the key growth areas in economics over the next twenty-ve years.
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A. Academia
In this subsection we explain why academic freedom, dened as the fact that researchers have
formal and real control rights on their research agendas, can be socially desirable in early stages
of a new research line, i.e. for more basic research, whereas allocating those control rights to
the employing rm, may dominate further down the line, i.e. for more applied research. This
section draws on Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein (2008), henceforth ADS.
For simplicity, consider a two-stage research line with each line starting with an initial idea
I0; and eventually generating a marketable product with value V after 2 successful stages. Each
stage requires one researcher. We assume that it is su¢ cient to hire one researcher per stage,
and that this researcher obtains a probability of success equal to p < 1 at any stage if he
follows the success-maximizing (practical) research strategy at that stage. But instead of
the practical strategy, the researcher is free to follow an alternativestrategy. If we assume
that the scientist has a zero individual probability of success following this approach, then
this alternative strategy amounts to the scientist working on an activity that he enjoys more
but that does not pay o¤ in monetary terms. However, we can reinterpret this alternative
strategy as the case in which the scientist works on an activity that may help initiate new
lines but does not generate progress on that particular line.
There is an innite supply of researchers at each stage, each of whom has an outside
option w. After being hired at stage j, the scientist is exposed to idea Ij 1, and then learns
whether he would prefer following the practical strategy or the alternative strategy. If he is
able to undertake his favored strategy, he su¤ers no disutility from working. If, however, the
scientist has to undertake the strategy that he likes less, he su¤ers disutility of z. The ex ante
probability that a scientist prefers to follow the practical strategy is given by . Assume
further that the choice of the practical vs. alternative strategy is ex ante non-contractible.8
Academic research (or freedom) di¤ers from private-sector research in that it leaves control
rights over the research strategy in the hands of the researcher. Thus if a research line is
pursued in academia, the researcher is paid wage w and always works on his preferred strategy.
This implies that with probability , the scientist works on the practical strategy, and with
probability (1   ), he works on the alternative strategy. Thus the ex ante probability of
advancing to the next stage is given by p. Now consider a researcher employed by the private
sector. Whether the researcher prefers the practical or the alternative strategy, becomes
evident once the researcher has been hired by the rm and has been given access to the
idea by the rm owner. Yet ex post, the rm owner has the authority to force the scientist
to work on the practical strategy. Anticipating this, the researcher will demand a wage of
wp = w + (1   )z in order to work in the private sector. The (1   )z markup over the
academic wage represents compensation for loss of creative freedomthe fact that scientists
now always have to adopt the practical strategy, whether this turns out to coincide with their
preferences or not.
A.0.1. When is freedom optimal?
A main nding in ADS is that academic freedom tends to dominate private sector focus at
earlier stages on a research line. To see this, take a research line involving 2 stages, and
suppose that the rst stage has been successful, so that we are now at stage 2, with one more
stage to be completed in order to generate a payo¤ of V . If this last stage of research is
done in the private sector, the expected payo¤ is equal to E(p2) = pV   wp: If instead the
last stage is done in academia, the expected payo¤ is equal to E(a2) = pV  w: This means
that private sector research will yield a higher payo¤ than free (academic) research and only
if (1  )pV > (wp   w); or equivalently pV > z:
Now, let 2 denote the maximum of E(
p
2) and E(
a
2). Moving back to stage 1, we now
compare between E(p1) = p2 wp and E(a1) = p2 w: Private sector research will yield
8In other words, one cannot write a contract that promises a scientist a bonus for following the practical
strategy, because the nature of what kind of work that strategy entails cannot be adequately described ahead
of time.
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a higher payo¤ than free (academic) research at stage 1 if and only if p2 > z:
Since 2 < V , it follows that private sector research is value-maximizing at stage 1, it is
also value-maximizing at stage 2. In particular it cannot be value maximizing to have academic
freedom operate at later stages than private sector research. The key result is therefore that
academic freedom will be the optimal governance structure at earlier stages and private sector
research will be optimal at later stages. The intuition is that while academias wage cost
advantage stays constant over research stages, its lower probability of success becomes more
problematic as one approaches the nal value V .
This result can be generalized to lines of any length k : if i denotes the NPVs of the line
of length k as of stage i; we have:
i = maxfE(pi ) = pi+1   wp; E(ai ) = pi+1   wg < i+1:
This monotonicity property, together with the fact that research should be pursued under
academic freedom if and only if pi+1 > z; yields the desired result.
A.0.2. Discussion
Note that the model so far provides a rationale for free (academic) research even in the extreme
case where the alternative strategy has no value beyond saving the researcher the disutility
of pursuing the practical strategy. In reality however there is value in experimenting with
ideas that may lead to an entirely new research lines, consistently with the idea that scientic
discoveries do not follow a purely linearmodel. This does not alter the relative optimality
of academia (vs. private research) in earlier (vs. later) stages of research. It does, however,
raise the desirability of freedom in general (and academia as the institutional regime that
supports such freedom), if we make the realistic assumption that pursuing the alternative
strategy confers a higher probability of generating entirely new research lines than pursuing
the practical strategy (note that, realistically, the probability of such an event, possibly the
result of an accidentaldiscovery, is nonzero for both strategies).
Finally, how do universities commit to leaving control rights with their researchers? Our
answer is that the duration of employment contracts in academia are veriable and enforceable
by third parties, and prevent the university from ring the faculty without very good reasons.
In particular the tenure mechanism ensures that a faculty cannot be red at all unless found
out in fault. This we see as a very e¤ective way to credibly allocate formal authority to the
academic researcher over his research agenda.
A complementary answer is that research universities are basically non-prot organizations,
which implies in particular that they do not have the resources to micro-manage the research
of their faculty members, i.e. to monitor what the faculty do. In terms of the Aghion-Tirole
model, university administrations and presidents do not have the means nor the incentives to
invest in information acquisition about the kind of research their faculty engage in (this latter
point is formalized in ADS).
A.1. Information, communication and the allocation of authority in multi-divisional
rms
Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008), henceforth ADM, apply the methodology and ap-
proach of Dessein (2002) to study the allocation of decision-making authority in a multi-
divisional organization. The main question addressed in their paper is how the need for
coordination a¤ects the allocation of control in large multi-national or multi-unit organiza-
tions. ADM consider two business units, each run by a di¤erent division manager, which
share a common central o¢ ce. Business-units are prot centers, and division managers are
(exogenously) assumed to care more about localprots in their own unit, than about the
rms overall prots. For example, as in Stein (1997), the manager may be able to siphon
o¤ some of the prots of the unit he runs. Each manager also observes some independent
private information which is a¤ects the optimal way to run his own unit. The central o¢ ce,
or headquarters, in contrast, does not generate any prots of its own, yet the headquarter
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manager may choose to keep control rights over decisions relevant to the two business units.
Alternatively, headquarters may choose to leave these control rights with the division man-
agers. The headquarter is assumed to maximize total rm prots (think of the headquarter
manager as being the owner of the overall rm).
Each business unit must take a (non-contractible) action which should ideally be both,
responsive to the local information observed by the unit manager, and coordinated with the
decision taken by the other unit. Overall prot maximization thus entails both, adaptation to
local information, and coordination with other unit. Should headquarters keep control over
these decisions which involve coordination externalities, or should they decentralize decision-
making to the business units managers so as to make it more responsive to local information?
As in Dessein (2002), the cost of centralization is that each unit manager will typically dis-
tort the local information he receives in order to inuence the headquarters decision-making
process and tilt it towards maximizing prots in his own unit. On the other hand, centraliza-
tion facilitates coordination between the decisions in the two units. A main di¤erence with
Dessein (2002) is that here also under decentralization unit managers have an incentive to dis-
tort their local information, because of the strategic interaction between the two units. Under
decentralization, the horizontal communication between the two unit managers will also be
strategic and distorted, as division managers have di¤erent objectives and aim to inuence
each others decisions. Hence, it all boils down to whether decentralized coordination (whereby
division manager communicate horizontally with each other) is preferred over centralized co-
ordination (whereby division managers communicate vertically with the headquarters which
then makes the nal decisions).
A rst result is that vertical communication is always more informative than horizontal
communication as the conict of interest is larger between the two divisions than between
either division and the headquarters. As long as the need for coordination is not too large (in
other words when the externalities between the two divisions are su¢ ciently small), decentral-
ization is strictly optimal, even when division managers only care about the prots of their own
business unit. As coordination considerations become more important, i.e. as externalities
between the two units increase, decentralized decision-making remains optimal provided the
two division managers put enough weight on joint prots. It is only when both coordination
considerations are important and division managers are su¢ ciently based towards maximizing
prots in their own unit centralized control by headquarters becomes optimal.
The idea that centralization helps coordination, is also developed by Hart and Holmstrom
(2010), henceforth HH. Like ADM, HH consider a two-unit rm where control rights on how
to run each unit can either be allocated to the unit manager or to an outside "headquarter"
manager. Unlike in ADM where informational considerations feature prominently, in HH the
trade-o¤ between centralization and delegation can be summarized as follows: under central-
ization, the headquarter maximizes the sum of monetary benets of the two units, in particular
she will always make sure that the two units coordinate whenever coordination maximizes the
sum of monetary benets; however the cost of centralization is that private benets are not
internalized by the decision maker. By contrast, under decentralization, each unit manager
seeks to maximize his own monetary plus private benets, and in particular he will oppose
coordination whenever coordinating does not maximize this sum, even if coordination happens
to maximize the sum of monetary benets. In case the principal has the possibility to ensure
coordination after all by taking control back from unit managers, delegation has the further
cost that its reversal generates grievance and therefore shading by the unit manager (s).
B. The empirics of performance heterogeneity across countries and
rms
After our theoretical overview of incomplete contracting and the organization of rms we
present an overview of the empirical literature on the topic. Before doing this we rst examine
some of the literature motivating the study of the organization of rms, which examines the
incredible di¤erences in productivity between rms and countries.
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B.1. Productivity patterns at the country level
In terms of aggregate growth, Solow (1957)s initially surprising nding that a large fraction of
the growth of the US economy was due to growth in residual total factor productivity (TFP)
rather than the accumulation of factor inputs such as labor or capital, has now been replicated
in numerous countries. In growth theory TFP is assigned to the generation and di¤usion of
hard technological innovations such as hybrid corn, beta blockers and information and
communication technologies (ICT). With the advent of better micro-economic data on plant
productivity, researchers such as Bailey, Hulten and Campbell (1992) were able to show that
about half of aggregate US productivity growth was due to the reallocation of output among
plants rather than simply increases in productivity of ongoing incumbent plants. Thus, the
idea of a representative plant or rm increasing its productivity can be very misleading as
a description of the creative destruction at play in the wider economy with much aggregate
TFP growth coming from ine¢ cient low productivity establishments shrinking and exiting the
economy in conjunction with more productive plants growing .
More recently, what is true in the time series also appears to be true in the cross section.
Figure A1 shows the correlation between GDP per capita and TFP for a large number of
countries. It is clear that those countries with high TFP are also the countries with high GDP
per capita, suggesting that TFP is critical for understanding cross-country success. But this
aggregate TFP di¤erence is also strongly inuenced by how di¤erent economies allocate output
to plants of heterogeneous productivity levels. For example, Figure A2 shows the estimated
productivity distribution of the manufacturing sectors in the US and India from Hsieh and
Klenow (2009). Compared to the US, India appears to have a much longer left tailof low
productivity plants. This suggests that there is something about the structure of the Indian
economy that is more forgiving of low productivity rms than in the US. A large number
of possible explanations present themselves that we will later examine such as competitive
intensity in the product market, labor regulations, distortions due to corruption and tax, etc.
What these lines of research show is that productivity dispersion at the micro-economic
level is fundamental to understanding the macro-economic patterns. But this only pushes the
question one level deeper: what causes rm heterogeneity?
B.2. Productivity heterogeneity
Research on rm heterogeneity has a long history in social science (Syverson (2010) o¤ers
a longer survey). Systematic empirical analysis rst focused on the rm size distribution
measured by employment, sales or assets. Most famously, Gibrat (1931), characterized the
size distribution as approximately log normal and sought to explain this with reference to
simple statistical models of growth (i.e. Gibrats Law that rm growth is independent of
size). In recent decades access to large scale (frequently near population) databases in the
government (e.g. the Longitudinal Business Database of US establishments) and private sector
(e.g. Bureau Van Dijks Orbis database of rm accounts) has enabled researchers to look
more directly at rm productivity. The growing availability of plant-level data from the US
Census Bureau and other nations combined with rapid increases in computer power (allowing
much cheaper storage and ability to analyze such databases) has facilitated this development.
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2008) o¤er many examples of the cross country micro-
datasets now being used for productivity analysis.
One of the robust facts emerging from these analyses is the very high degree of heterogeneity
between business units (see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). For example, Syverson (2004a)
analyses labor productivity (output per worker) in US manufacturing establishments in the
1997 Economic Census and shows that on average, a plant at the 90th percentile of the
productivity distribution is over four times as productive as a plant at the 10th percentile in
the same four digit sector. Similarly, Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2003) show that in the
UK in 2000 there is a vefold di¤erence in productivity between these deciles.
What could explain these di¤erences in productivity, and how can they persist in a com-
petitive industry? One explanation is that if we accounted properly for the di¤erent inputs in
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the production function there would be little residual productivity di¤erences. It is certainly
true that moving from labor productivity to total factor productivity (TFP) reduces the scale
of the di¤erence. For example, in Syverson (2004b) the 90-10 productivity di¤erence falls from
a factor of 4 to a factor of 1.9, but it does not disappear.
These di¤erences show up clearly even for quite homogeneous goods. An early example is
Salter (1960) who studied the British pig iron industry between 1911 and 1926. He showed
that the best practice factory produced nearly twice as many tons per hour as the average
factory.
A major problem in measuring productivity is the fact that researchers rarely observe
plant level prices so an industry price deator is usually used. Consequently, measured TFP
typically includes an element of the rm-specic price-cost margin (e.g. Klette and Griliches,
1996). Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2009) study 11 seven-digit homogeneous goods
(including block ice, white pan bread, cardboard boxes and carbon black) where they have
access to plant specic output (and input) prices. They nd that conventionally measured
revenue based TFP (TFPR) numbers actually understate the degree of true productivity
dispersion (TFPQ) especially for newer rms as the more productive rms typically have
lower prices and are relatively larger.
Higher TFP is positively related to rm size, growth and survival probabilities. Bartelsman
and Dhrymes (1998, Table A.7) show that over a ve year period around one third of plants
stay in their productivity quintile. This suggests that productivity di¤erences are not purely
transitory shocks or measurement errors, but partially persist.
In summary, there is a substantial body of evidence of persistent rm-level heterogeneity in
rm productivity (and other dimensions of performance) in narrow industries in many coun-
tries and time periods. Di¤erential observable inputs, heterogeneous prices and idiosyncratic
stochastic shocks are not able to adequately account for the remarkable dispersion of produc-
tivity. So what could account for this? One long suggested factor is management practices,
with authors going back at least to Walker (1887) suggesting that management practices play
an essential role in explaining di¤erences in performance across rms.
B.3. Management measurement and heterogeneity
Progress in understanding the role of management has been severely limited by the absence of
high rm-level quality data. Recently, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) developed a survey tool
that can in principle be used to directly quantify management practices across rms, sectors
and countries. Fundamentally, the aim is to measure the overall managerial quality of the rm
by benchmarking it against a series of global best practices (see next section for a discussion
of what these mean).
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) use an interview-based evaluation tool that denes and
scores, from one (worst practice) to ve (best practice), eighteen basic management prac-
tices. This evaluation tool was developed by an international consulting rm to target practices
they believed were associated with better performance, covering three broad areas:
1. Monitoring: how well do companies track what goes on inside their rms, and use this for
continuous improvement? For example, is product quality regularly monitored so that
any production defects are quickly addressed rather than left to damage large volumes
of output.
2. Target setting: do companies set the right targets, track the right outcomes and take
appropriate action if the two are incongruent? For example, are individual produc-
tion targets calibrated to be stretching but achievable, rather than incredibly easy or
impossibly hard.
3. People: are companies promoting and rewarding employees based on ability and e¤ort,
and systematically trying to hire and keep their best employees? For example, are
employees that perform well, work hard and display high ability promoted faster than
employees who under-perform, are lazy and appear incompetent.
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The management survey tool excludes practices whose performance impact clearly depends
on individual rms circumstance for example, setting lower prices or M&A activity.
To obtain accurate responses from rms they interview production plant managers using
a double-blindtechnique. One part of this double-blind technique is that managers are not
told they are being scored or shown the scoring grid. They are only told they are being
interviewed about management practices for a research project. To run this blind scoring,
open questions were used since these do not tend to lead respondents to a particular answer.
For example, the rst monitoring question starts by asking tell me how you monitor your
production processrather than a closed question such as do you monitor your production
daily (yes/no). Interviewers also probed for examples to support assertions. The other side
of the double-blind technique is interviewers are not told in advance anything about the rms
performance to avoid prejudice. They are only provided with the company name, telephone
number and industry. Since the survey covers medium-sized rms (dened as those employing
between 100 and 10,000 workers) these would not be usually known ex ante by the interviewers.
The survey was targeted at plant managers, who are senior enough to have an overview of
management practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations. The
sample response rate was 45% and this was uncorrelated with measures of rm performance.
One way to summarize rm-specic quality is to z-score each individual question and
take an average across all eighteen questions. This management practice score is strongly
correlated with rm performance (total factor productivity, protability, growth rates, and
Tobins Q and survival rates) as well as rm size. These performance data were taken from
independently collected company accounts and imply that the managersresponses contained
real information. Figure A3 shows the correlation between the management score and labor
productivity, for example. Firms with higher management scores tend to have higher sales per
worker relative to the industry and country average. These correlations should by no means
be taken as causal but do suggest that the management data contains useful information.
We examine the identication issues in detail in Section 5 below. Other research shows that
better management is also associated with more energy e¢ cient production (Bloom, Genakos,
Martin and Sadun, 2010), better patient outcomes in hospitals (Bloom, Propper, Seiler and
Van Reenen, 2010) and improved work-life balance indicators (Bloom, Kretschmer and Van
Reenen, 2009).
The bar chart in Figure A4 plots the average management practice scores across countries
from the interviews. The US has the highest average management practice scores, with Ger-
many, Japan and Sweden below, followed by a block of mid-European countries (e.g. France,
Italy, the UK and Poland) and Australia, with Southern Europe and developing countries
Brazil, China, Greece and India at the bottom. In one sense this cross-country ranking is not
surprising since it approximates the cross-country distribution of productivity (recall Figure
A1).
The between country variation in average management scores are swamped by the within
country variation. Figure A5 plots out the histogram of management scores across rms
for each country in our sample. As with productivity there is huge variation in management
practices with many badly managed rms in all countries, even those with high average scores.
An interesting feature of Figure A5 is that the US appears to have little or no left tail of very
badly managed rms (say scores less than 2). In fact, a large fraction of the cross country
di¤erences in Figure A4 can be accounted for by whether a country has a thick or thin left
tail of badly managed rms. This immediately suggests that one factor causing cross country
di¤erences in productivity is the strength of the forces of selection which aggressively weed
out badly managed rms in countries like the US to a much greater extent than in India. This
would be consistent with the productivity data shown in Figure 2.
There are alternative approaches to measuring management or, more generally, attempts
to measure intangible capital or organizational capital (Prescott and Visscher, 1980).
First, one could try and infer these as residuals using relatively weak conditions (variants of
TFP) or more tightly specied structures (e.g. Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005). Secondly, one
can use past expenditures to build up intangible stocks exactly as would be done for tangible
capital (e.g. through the perpetual inventory method). This is frequently done for R&D and
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advertising, but it is far harder to accomplish for management as there is no clear data on
such expenditures . Third, more conventional paper and pen surveys can be used with closed
(limited number of responses like "yes" or "no") type questions (e.g. Black and Lynch, 2001).
There are a large number of these for individual countries, but very few that are comparable
across international boundaries.
C. Identication
We end this section with a discussion of identication issues. The empirical discussion above
was mainly in terms of partial correlations: what factors are associated with the variation in
rm organizational form. Incomplete contract (and other) theories suggest what we should
expect to observe, in equilibrium, covarying with decentralization. Such type of analysis is
useful and potentially consistent (or inconsistent) with theories. However, there is always an
endogeneityconcern with examining such correlations. Generally in social science we are
concerned whether a change in one variable causally changes the outcome in another. For
example, in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012b) we are concerned whether an exogenous
change in trust causes an increase in delegation. We observe a positive correlation even after
controlling for a host of other confounding inuences. Nevertheless, it could still be the case
that there is an omitted variable. For example, di¤erent strong local enforcement of the rule of
law could be correlated with both more trust and more decentralization. Alternatively, there
could be direct reverse causality: an increase in delegation could foster greater trust, rather
than the other way around.
There is a vast literature in statistics and econometrics on the identication of causal
relationships and this has become a strong focus of interest in economics over the last decade.
Consider a binary variable of interest Di = f0; 1g; e.g. whether trust is high in rm i or
not and an outcome of interest Yi, e.g. the degree of decentralization. Dene the potential
outcomes for rm i as Y1i if Di = 1 and Y0i if Di = 0: We may be interested in Y1i   Y0i,
i.e. the degree of decentralization that occurs from shifting a rm from a low to high trust
environment. Essentially the problem is constructing a valid counterfactual: i.e. what would
have happened to the same treated rm in the absence of the treatment (and vice versa)?
Since this is not directly observed the design of the empirical study has to reconstruct this
counterfactual.
The naive approach would be to compare the outcomes of those who were treated with
those who were not, i.e. E(YijDi = 1)  E(YijDi = 0): Unfortunately this is unlikely to get us
what we want because
E(YijDi = 1) E(YijDi = 0) = fE(Y1ijDi = 1) E(Y0ijDi = 1)g+fE(Y0ijDi = 1) E(Y0ijDi = 0)g
(C.1)
The rst term is on the right hand side, fE(Y1ijDi = 1) E(Y0ijDi = 1)g; is the "average
treatment e¤ect on the treated" and an object of interest. But the second term fE(Y0ijDi =
1)   E(Y0ijDi = 0)g is a "selection bias" which will in general not be zero. The rms who
have high trust are not randomly allocated.
There are several ways to construct the counterfactual. First, we could run a eld experi-
ment. This has been surprisingly under-utilized in organizational economics (except in the lab
with students) even though randomized control trials are becoming common in some areas of
applied economics such as development and labor. The benet of a eld experiment is that if
properly implemented (and this is a big "if") the control group is the valid counterfactual. For
the most part we have to rely on non-experimental approaches to construct the counterfactual.
Classically, researchers will condition on many other variables to deal with the endogeneity
concern, so we look at the object
E(YijDi = 1; Xi)  E(YijDi = 0; Xi)
This may help so long as the Xs are exogenous (if not then we may make the biases worse
- the bad controlproblem). But unless we have a very rich set of controls in the X-vector
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there could still be selection on the unobservables implying that there will still be a bias
remaining. Matching estimators (e.g. on the propensity score) to obtain the counterfactual
helps ensure a common support between treatment and control groups. But if there are still
correlated unobservables then matching will not eliminate the selection bias in equation.
There are various identication strategies to eliminate the bias. First, controlling for
rm xed e¤ects and time dummies ("Di¤erence in Di¤erences" or DD) is one approach if
there is panel data. However, if there is a correlated unobservable shock there will still be
bias. Second, instrumental variables can be used (and combined with DD). Essentially this
requires a variable correlated with Di but uncorrelated with the error term. A randomized
control trial generates the instrument which is whether a rm has been randomly assigned to
treatment or control (see Bloom et al, 2010, below). In the context of the decentralization-
trust relationship, Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012b) use religious di¤erences between
countries to instrument bilateral trust following Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010). As
noted above, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) exploit a policy experiment of trade liberalization
to obtain exogenous variation in competition as US rms who operated more intensively in
product markets where tari¤s fell the most would be (exogenously) more strongly a¤ected
by the policy change. Finally, regression discontinuity designs have become a popular way
of constructing counterfactuals in designs where there is a discontinuous break in a variable
of interest. For example, in examining the e¤ects of US labor unions on rm performance
DiNardo and Lee (2004) examine the outcomes of union elections where workers narrowly
voted in favor of the union compared to elections where they voted narrowly against. Because
the unobservables should be balanced on either side of the discontinuity this can in principle
deal with the selection problem.
The current literature on empirical organizational economics has not emphasized the iden-
tication issues discussed here, partially because of the di¢ culty of addressing causality. Some-
times a structural model is proposed and the parameters are estimated from the data (e.g.
Garicano and Hubbard, 2009). There is nothing in principle wrong with this and any model
makes some assumptions. A concern with some structural work, of course, is that the model
may be rather inexible and imposed when it is at stark variance with some main features
of the data. The identication procedures discussed here can be combined with structural
estimation, although this has rarely happened in practice in empirical economics.
It is likely that more papers on credible identication in organizational economics will be
a growth area in the future.
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Figure 1: Decentralization is higher in Scandinavia and Anglo 
Saxon countries, and lower in Asia and Southern Europe
Decentralization measure (higher number is more decentralized)
Source: Histogram of decentralization across firms within each country. The definition of decentralization follows 
Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012b), with data updated to 2010 from www.worldmanagementsurvey.com
Figure 2: Decentralization varies heavily across firms within 
every country
Decentralization measure (higher number is more decentralized)
Source: Histogram of decentralization across firms within each country. The definition of decentralization follows 
Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012b), with data updated to 2010 from www.worldmanagementsurvey.com
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Figure 3, Decentralization is higher when heterogeneity is 
greater
Source: Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007)
Figure 4, Decentralization is higher when plants are closer 
to the TFP frontier
Source: Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007)
Figure 5, Decentralization is higher in younger plants
Source: Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007)
